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Abstract 
Research on the psychology of paranormal, religious and delusional belief has been stifled by 
a lack of careful distinction between anomalous experiences and corresponding attributions. 
The Survey of Anomalous Experience (SAE: Irwin, Dagnall & Drinkwater, 2013) addresses 
this nuance by measuring Proneness to Anomalous Experience (PAE) and Proneness to 
Paranormal Attribution (PPA). Re-analyzing existing data (351 men, 1,026 women) from 
previously published studies, we examined the SAE’s internal validity via Rasch scaling and 
differential item functioning analyses. PPA showed good Rasch model fit and no item-bias, 
but it lacked adequate reliability. Several PAE items showed misfit to the Rasch model or 
gender-bias, though deleting five items produced a scale with acceptable reliability. Finally, 
we failed to validate a three-category rating scale version with the goal of improving the 
SAE’s psychometric properties. All three formulations revealed a secondary factor related to 
the items’ extremity rather than contents, suggesting that future research should consider the 
intensity of respondents’ anomalous experiences and paranormal attributions. 
 
Keywords: Anomalous experience; attribution theory; paranormal belief; psychometrics; 
Rasch scaling 
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Anomalous Experiences and Paranormal Attributions: 
Psychometric Challenges in Studying their Measurement and Relationship 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Anomalistic psychology posits that anomalous experiences have orthodox 
explanations resulting from psychological or physical factors that suggest parapsychological 
activity to some people under certain conditions (Jones & Zusne, 1981; French & Stone, 
2013). That is, paranormal beliefs and experiences in the general population are regarded as 
cognitive aberrations within established frameworks of problem-solving or decision-making. 
The moniker anomalous is therefore synonymous with unexplained and references both the 
aberrant salience (Irwin, 2014; Irwin, Schofield, & Baker, 2014) and ambiguity surrounding 
purported parapsychological events and their susceptibility to a myriad of possible 
interpretations (Houran, Lynn & Lange, 2017; Irwin, Dagnall & Drinkwater, 2012). This 
view implies two, potentially dissociable components: (i) the occurrence of anomalous 
experiences, and (ii) the parapsychological interpretation of these experiences. Inventories for 
assessing subjective parapsychological or anomalous experiences and delusion-like ideations 
[e.g., the Anomalous Experiences Inventory (AEI): Gallagher, Kumar & Pekala, 1994 and the 
Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI: Peters et al., 1999, 2004)] typically do not distinguish 
between these two components (David, 2010; Irwin, Dagnall & Drinkwater, 2013) and 
instead conflate them. Likewise, an important limitation of much research in the cognitive 
science of religion is that measures rarely tease apart general religious beliefs (e.g., “God 
exists”), personal religious beliefs (e.g., “God appeared to me last night”) and experiences 
supporting these beliefs (van Leeuwen & van Elk, 2018).  
To address these conceptual and measurement limitations, Irwin et al. (2013) 
introduced the Survey of Anomalous Experiences (SAE) – which comprises two subscales 
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that distinguish Proneness to Anomalous Experiences (PAE) from Proneness to Paranormal 
Attributions (PPA) in the study of subjective parapsychological experiences. Irwin et al 
(2013) found that PAE and PPA were positively associated; however, in this study and other 
research this relationship was found to be modest (rho’s = .29 to .40, p < .001; cf. Irwin, 
2015, 2017, 2018; Irwin & Wilson, 2013), thereby suggesting that the subscales may be 
distinct, discernible factors. Moreover, PAE and PPA correlated positively with measures of 
schizotypy, emotion-based reasoning and suspension of reality testing. Irwin et al. (2013) 
found the only statistically significant difference between the two subscales concerned 
associations with executive dysfunction: PAE correlated significantly with executive 
dysfunction, but PPA did not. Overall these findings were interpreted as offering conceptual 
and psychometric support for the SAE. However, the authors noted that further work 
examining relationships between SAE subscales and executive dysfunction was required. 
Subsequent research has shown that both PAE and PPA correlate with an intuitive thinking 
style (Irwin & Wilson, 2013), whereas stress sensitivity and minimal-self dysfunction 
correlated with PAE but not PPA (Irwin, 2018).  
Ross, Hartig, and McKay (2017) used the SAE to explore the role of reasoning biases 
in the formation of paranormal explanations of anomalous experiences. This study built on 
research highlighting cognitive deficits associated with paranormal beliefs (for a review, see 
Irwin, 2009), i.e., the adoption of implausible explanations for anomalous experiences due to 
improper or biased consideration of evidence. In addition, Ross et al. (2017) suggested that 
this result may have implications for cognitive theories of delusions. For instance, Lange and 
Houran’s model of subjective paranormal belief and experience (Houran & Lange, 2004; 
Lange & Houran, 1998, 1999, 2000) specifically draws on attribution theory in the clinical 
literature (e.g., Jaspers, 1923/1963; Maher, 1988, 1992; Kihlstrom & Hoyt, 1988), which 
  5 
explains delusions as a byproduct of an individual’s failure to find a standard explanation for 
ambiguous events or anomalous experiences.  
 
Other research challenges the adequacy of a “one-factor” model of delusions and 
recommends a “two-factor” model (Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay, 2011; Davies, Coltheart, 
Langdon, & Breen, 2001). According to two-factor models, a second factor – an impairment 
of the belief evaluation system – is required to explain the process by which unusual 
(ambiguous or anomalous) experiences lead to delusional beliefs. Consistent with two-factor 
models, Ross et al. (2017) found that individuals low in “analytic cognitive style” (i.e., the 
willingness or disposition to critically evaluate outputs from intuitive processing and engage 
in effortful analytic processing) are more likely to invoke paranormal or esoteric labels for 
anomalous experiences. Thus, empirically speaking, this study lends further credence to 
Irwin et al.’s (2013) SAE instrument. 
 
The Present Study 
Although the available literature seems to recommend the SAE as an improved 
conceptual and empirical measure for researching self-reported parapsychological 
experiences, its psychometric qualities remain open to examination. In particular, it is well-
established (Bond & Fox, 2001; Wright & Stone, 1979) that there can be serious 
measurement problems with instruments developed using Classical Test Theory (CTT), and 
unfortunately, the SAE and most measures used in the paranormal belief and anomalous 
experience literature have been developed using these methods (see e.g., Drinkwater, 
Denovan, Dagnall & Parker, 2017; Gallagher et al., 1994; Jinks, 2012; Mehmet & Yesilyurt, 
2014; Reiner & Wilson, 2015; Schofield, Baker, Staples & Sheffield, 2018; Storm, 
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Drinkwater & Jinks, 2017; Tobacyk, 2004).  Specifically, CTT has at least four main 
limitations: 
 The usual approach within CTT is to develop a test consisting of a number of items, 
and to assume that the sum of the scores received on the test items defines the latent 
trait. Consequently, summed scores do not provide linear (i.e., interval-level) 
measures of the underlying trait. Raw scores are ordinal measures at best and, as a 
consequence, it is possible that group differences and treatment effects are distorted; 
 
 Traditional scaling approaches essentially treat all questionnaire items as equivalent, 
thereby ignoring how the difficulty of the stimuli interacts with respondents’ trait 
levels to produce the outcome of the test. As a result, it is difficult to select those 
questions that are most appropriate for a specific population of respondents; 
 
 The standard raw score approach does not recognize that some items may be biased 
such that subjects with identical trait levels receive systematically different scores. 
This might be the case for instance when women (or younger respondents) endorse 
some questions more (less) often then do men (or older respondents) with equal trait 
levels. To the extent that subject groups show such differential response tendencies, 
the questions involved are said to be biased; 
 
 Since traditional scaling approaches do not model respondents’ expected answers to 
each of the items, aberrant response records cannot be identified. For instance, it 
cannot be determined whether low scores are due to low trait levels rather than 
malingering, item biases, or respondents’ misunderstanding or incomplete processing 
of the questions. In other words, traditional scaling approaches offer no indicators of 
the internal validity of respondents’ scores. 
In a psychometric study of paranormal belief that avoided these limitations, Lange, 
Irwin and Houran (2000) introduced a series of statistical analyses grounded in Modern Test 
Theory (MTT) that they described as a “top-down purification” process. This method is used 
increasingly in consciousness studies (see e.g., Irwin & Marks, 2013; Preti, Vellante, & 
Petretto, 2017), and it combines Rasch (1960/1980) scaling with the removal of age- or 
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gender-related response biases at the test and item levels. Controlling for such biases is 
critical, because statistical theory (Stout, 1987) and computer simulations (Lange, Irwin, & 
Houran, 2000) alike demonstrate that response biases can lead to spurious factor structures of 
constructs, significant distortions in scores, and consequently erroneous reliability and 
validity findings. For an overview of the advantages of MTT, and specifically Rasch scaling, 
as applied to anomalistic psychology and consciousness studies we refer readers to Lange 
(2017).   
We collated data from seven published studies (Irwin et al 2013; Irwin, Schofield, & 
Baker, 2014; Irwin & Wilson, 2013; Irwin, 2015, 2017, 2018; Ross et al., 2017) to conduct a 
comprehensive evaluation of the SAE’s measurement properties via “top-down purification” 
analysis. We explored two primary issues: 
 Hypothesis 1: Self-reported anomalous experiences (PAE) and paranormal 
attributions (PPA) on the SAE will conform to a hierarchical Rasch (1960/1980) 
scale, thereby providing evidence of discernible factors and conceptually replicating 
previous findings of inherent probabilistic structures underlying paranormal-esoteric 
beliefs (Lange, Irwin & Houran, 2000; Lange & Thalbourne, 2002; Irwin & Marks, 
2013) and subjective anomalous-paranormal experiences (Houran & Lange, 2001; 
Houran, Wiseman & Thalbourne, 2002; Lange & Thalbourne, 2007; Lange, 
Thalbourne, Houran & Storm, 2000; Funkhouser, 2007; Lange, Greyson & Houran, 
2008). 
 
 Hypothesis 2: The PAE and PPA subscales will evidence (or can be readily modified 
to produce) interval-level, bias free measurements, which will improve the reliability 
of validity of Irwin et al.’s (2013) original SAE approach. 
 
METHOD 
Rasch Scaling 
Readers might benefit from a summary of the basic features of the (binary) Rasch 
(1960/1980) model used in the present study, although more detailed information is provided 
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by Bond and Fox (2015) and Lange (2017). This model focuses on Pij (the probability that 
person i will endorse item j) given that the person has trait level Ti and the item assesses the 
trait at level Dj. The latter is also referred to as the item’s difficulty. The quantities are related 
as: 
log(Pij / (1 -Pij)) = Ti – Dj        (1) 
Items’ fit to Equation 1 are assessed via their Outfit values, where values in the range 0.5 to 
1.4 are generally deemed acceptable. Other factors can be included in the model to assess 
their impact (see e.g., Linacre, 2018a, b), either as main effects (e.g., men vs women), or as 
interaction effects. Of particular interest are interactions involving the Dj, as this indicates 
that items’ difficulties vary across sub-groups, thus creating different item hierarchies. Such 
interactions are also referred to as “biases” or as Differential Item Functioning (DIF). For 
instance, we might find that some items are easier (or harder) to endorse for men than for 
women with equal trait levels; and these items are said to be biased or show DIF. 
 Rasch scaling defines reliability (R) analogous to the approach in CTT. However, 
with a Rasch scaling framework, reliability computations rely on the test-takers’ estimated 
trait levels T in Equation 1 rather than their raw scores. As a result, R values tend to be 
generally lower than those for KR-20 or coefficient alpha. Rasch scaling allows for (non-
systematic) missing data; hence, in contrast to the CTT approach, R can be estimated in the 
presence of missing data. We note that the trait levels T cannot strictly be estimated for 
“perfect” scores (i.e., when test-takers’ responses are either all 0 or all 1), and R is typically 
computed twice, once with and once without extreme scores. The former R value typically 
being higher than the latter. 
All Rasch analyses performed here use the Winsteps and Facets software (Linacre, 
2018a, b) whose JMLE estimation algorithm does not make any assumptions about the 
distribution of trait levels and item difficulties. As a result, the shapes of the item and person 
  9 
distributions does not materially affect the estimates of the D and T parameters. It is finally 
noted that Rasch scaling assumes that the test items should define a unidimensional 
dimension, and this issue is addressed here via factor analysis of items’ Rasch residuals (see 
Linacre, 2018a). 
 
Data and Respondents 
 We collated data (n = 1,377) from seven published studies for analysis (i.e., Irwin, 
2015, 2017, 2018; Irwin, Dagnall & Drinkwater, 2013; Irwin, Schofield & Baker, 2014; Irwin 
& Wilson, 2013; Ross et a., 2017), consisting of 351 men and 1026 women (Mage = 32.3 yrs, 
SD = 19.5, range = 18 - 75 yrs). These reflect predominantly convenience samples of students 
from Australian and British universities. We refer readers to the original papers for further 
details on the respective recruitment methods and respondents’ demographic backgrounds. 
Data were originally collected in compliance with the Human Research Ethics Committees at 
Manchester Metropolitan University, the University of New England, and Royal Holloway, 
University of London. Conventions for obtaining informed consent required by each 
investigator's research institution, as well as IRB or ethical committees were followed. All 
participants provided written informed consent prior to participation. The study was 
conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical 
Association, 2013). 
    ---- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
Measure 
 The Survey of Anomalous Experience (SAE) is a 20-item inventory developed by 
Harvey Irwin to gauge self-reported anomalous experiences (Irwin et al., 2013, pp. 51-53), 
and the items’ text is shown in Table 1. For each item, respondents are presented with an 
anomalous experience described without any explicit reference to its possible cause. 
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Respondents who report having had such an experience are asked to further clarify their 
position by stating whether they attributed their experience to a specified paranormal process 
or alternatively, to a specified non-paranormal process. Thus, for each item addressing an 
anomalous experience, the respondent has three response options of the following general 
form: Option 1, “Yes, and it must have been [specific paranormal attribution]”; Option 2, 
“Yes, but it was probably just [specific non-paranormal attribution]"; and Option 3, “No.”1  
The index of Proneness to Anomalous Experiences (PAE) is defined in terms of the 
“yes” responses (i.e., Option 1 or 2 in any item) to each of the 20 items. Thus, Rasch scaling 
proceeds from a complete response record of 0’s and 1’s. Second, each participant’s 
Proneness to Paranormal Attributions (PPA) to anomalous experiences was defined in terms 
of the “yes” (Option 1 or 2) responses with a paranormal attribution (i.e., the answer was 
“yes, paranormal”, Option 1). By its very nature this introduces missing data, as scoring is 
conditional on at least one “yes” response. However, these “missing data” cases are rare, less 
than 1% of the total sample. While missing data are problematic when using CTT 
approaches, they are not generally problematic when using Rasch scaling, and this allows the 
computation of realistic estimates of scale reliability, even for the PPA. The preceding 
assumes that missing values occur in a non-systematic fashion, which is not the case here. 
Fortunately, it has been found that the impact of violations of this assumption is typically 
quite small (Linacre, 1994).  
Since the PAE and PPA respectively omit or combine data, it seemed desirable to 
have an instrument that exhausts all available observations. For this reason, we introduce the 
SAE3, a three-category rating scale version of the SAE, which treats the three possible SAE 
answers as defining an ordinal progression toward paranormality, i.e., “no” (not observed) < 
                                                          
1 Ross et al. (2017) lightly edited some of the items (see supplementary materials file included with their paper 
for precise wording) and the response options. Response items had the following general form: Option 1, "Yes, 
and it was probably [specific paranormal attribution]"; Option 2, "Yes, but it was probably just [specific non-
paranormal attribution]"; and Option 3, "No". 
  11 
“yes” (with normal attribution) < “yes” (with paranormal attribution). The psychometric 
performance of this formulation will be tested analogous to the PAE and PPA, i.e., we expect 
that Hypotheses 1 and 2 apply. 
RESULTS 
 Table 1 summarizes the Rasch scaling results for each of the three variables. Here, the 
items’ location (difficulty) parameter are listed in the “Item Loc” columns and Outfit values 
in columns labeled “Outfit”. DIF effects (if any) are shown in the columns so labeled. Other 
statistics are discussed later in context: Table 1 shows “Loading” columns, and Table 2 
shows statistics related to test reliability, DIF, main effects, residual loadings, and loading 
correlations. 
   ----- Insert Table 2 about here ---- 
Proneness to Paranormal Attribution (PPA) 
 All twenty SAE items scored according to the PPA rules show good fit to the Rasch 
model as none of their Outfit values exceed the criterion value of 1.4 (range = 0.70 to 1.24, 
see PPA Outfit column Table 1). Next, we performed an overall statistical test for DIF (i.e., 
variation in items’ Dj) due to age and gender using Linacre’s (2018b) Facets software. Table 
2 shows that neither Age- nor Gender-DIF reached statistical significance (see columns under 
DIF 2). In other words, we failed to reject the null hypotheses that the item hierarchy is the 
same across younger and older people, as well as across women and men.  
Table 2 further shows that the observed average person differences (i.e., Tj in 
Equation 1) across gender and age are trivial (0.02 logits and 0.06 logits, respectively) and 
these differences fail to reach statistical significance (we used p < .01 throughout given the 
exploratory nature of our analyses). While the preceding is very encouraging, we note that 
the PPA has poor reliability. As is shown in Table 2, the Rasch reliability R is 0.24 when 
extreme scores are included and 0.55 when extreme scores are excluded. 
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Proneness to Anomalous Experience (PAE) 
 When focusing on anomalous experiences (i.e., regardless of these being interpreted 
as normal or paranormal) the SAE items show much poorer fit. Specifically, as is indicated 
by the boldface entries in the PAE Outfit column in Table 1, the Outfit of items 1 and 5 (1.45 
and 1.49, respectively) exceed the criterion of 1.4 by less than 0.10. However, these minor 
excursions are dwarfed by the Outfit values of 2.01 and 5.77 observed for items 3 (“being 
contacted by people one had been thinking about”) and item 4 (“knowing what someone says 
before they say it”), respectively. Clearly, these items received very noisy (i.e., inconsistent) 
answers. 
In addition, statistically significant overall item hierarchy differences were observed 
across gender (but not age, see Table 2), and we suggest that the misfit of Items 3 and 4 is 
related to their Gender-DIF. As is shown in the PAE “Gender-DIF” column of Table 1, 
women endorse items 4 and 5 more often than do men, the difference being 0.94 and 0.55 
logits respectively. By contrast, men endorse items 8 (“envelope of light reflecting well-
being”), 16 (“‘self’ was moving through a tunnel of light”), and 18 (“having abilities not 
inherited from parents”) more often than women. 
The preceding reflects important differences between men and women’s item 
hierarchies. For instance, it follows from Equation 1 after solving for Pij, that for men and 
women with below average trait levels (say, -2 logits) men interpret Item 3 as paranormal 
with probability 34% whereas women do so with probability 77%. The analogous 
probabilities for Item 4 are 55 and 88%, respectively. Table 2 shows that PAE has far greater 
reliability than does the PPA, and that there exist statistically significant gender and age main 
effects. However, given the items’ misfit and biases, these findings should be interpreted with 
caution. 
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SAE3 
 Recall that the SAE3 redefines the responses as forming a 3-category ordinal scale. 
This yields a set of items that fits the Rasch rating scale model, because Outfit values for all 
items fall below 1.4. As was the case for the PPA and PAE, no Age-DIF was observed, but 
significant overall item hierarch differences were obtained for women versus men. Table 1 
shows Gender DIF in Items 3 and 4 similar to the PAE, but now Item 5 (“impression of a 
figure”) is over-endorsed by women as well. By contrast, 8 (“envelope of light reflecting 
well-being”), 11 (“being outside of physical body”), 13 (“healed by power of mind”), 14 
(“object unaccountably moved”), and 16 (“‘self’ was moving through a tunnel of light”) 
receive higher endorsement from men.   
The pervasive Gender-DIF suggested that the SAE formulation is untenable and 
hence no further analyses were performed.  
----    Insert Figure 1 about here ---- 
Ancillary Analyses 
 Dimensionality. To clarify the source of the various limitations in the three SAE 
formulations, we performed separate factor analysis of response’s residuals for each model as 
obtained via Winsteps (Linacre, 2018a). Not all factor analyses are shown, but for the case of 
the PAE Figure 1 plots items’ loadings according to their locations in logits (X-axis) and their 
loadings on the first (and most important) residual factor (X-axis). It can be seen that as items 
become more difficult (i.e., going from left to right along X) their loadings decrease 
systematically. Table 2 (Residual Factors, Loadings) shows the loading ranges for the three 
scale formulations, and it can be seen that the three-category formulation (SAE3) has the 
widest loading variation (range = -0.68 to 0.71).  
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Note that some residual factors are quite strong, they explain from 9 to 15% of the 
variance remaining after the items and persons are accounted for (see Table 2), the maximum 
occurring for the SAE3. Also, considerable agreement among the three residual factors’ 
loadings was observed. In particular, Table 2 (“Loading Correlation”) shows that items’ 
residual loadings are highly correlated (0.72 < r < 0.96), i.e., each of the SAE scaling 
formulations showed similar residual loading patterns on the first residual factor across 
items’ extremity.  
Study Differences. Recall that we combined data from seven published studies and 
then treated this collection as a single data set. It is reasonable to ask therefore whether the 
item hierarchies vary across the studies that were used. This proved indeed to be the case as 
items’ locations showed significant Study x Item interactions for each of the PPA, PAE, and 
SAE3 (all p < .001). These hierarchy shifts proved difficult to interpret and are not reported 
here. However, this clearly introduces additional caveats for using the SAE.  
 
SUMMARY & DISCUSSION 
 Our hypotheses received mixed support. Confirming Hypothesis 1, we replicated 
previous findings that anomalous experiences and paranormal attributions exhibit 
hierarchical structures (Funkhouser, 2007; Houran & Lange, 2001; Houran, Wiseman, & 
Thalbourne, 2002; Lange, Irwin, & Houran, 2000; Lange & Thalbourne, 2002; Irwin & 
Marks, 2013; Lange & Thalbourne, 2007; Lange, Thalbourne, Houran, & Storm, 2000; 
Lange, Greyson, & Houran, 2008). This implies that individuals perceive or endorse specific 
aspects of these constructs to systematically different degrees. As such, we seem to observe 
qualitative differences as these phenomena progress along their respective quantitative 
dimensions.  
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Contrary to Hypothesis 2, we could neither validate nor readily modify the SAE to 
serve as a robust “top-down purified” aggregate measure. Instead, we showed that each of the 
SAE’s three derivative factors had its own set of limitations. First, the PPA fares quite well as 
it fits the Rasch model admirably. Yet, it should not be used in its current form due to poor 
reliability, and this cannot be rectified without adding more items. Second, the PAE showed 
acceptable reliability, but at least two of its items (i.e., “Sometimes I’ve been thinking of a 
person I haven’t heard from in ages, and later in the day I received a phone call, email or 
letter from that very person.” and “With someone I know intimately I sometimes know what 
they are about to say before they say it. ”) are problematic given unacceptable item fit and 
powerful Gender-DIF, both of which distort measurement. It is not clear at this point whether 
these items can simply be reworded, or whether they simply do not belong to the same 
domain as the other items. Finally, while showing acceptable item fit, the SAE3 three-
category formulation performed poorly due to pervasive Gender-DIF. Together with the 
finding of variation in items’ locations across studies, the preceding implies that the SAE3 
should not be used in its current form. Given the pattern displayed in Figure 1 for the PPA, 
and the similar patterns for the PAE and SAE3 (not reported), the extremity of items’ 
difficulties should play a major role in this endeavor.  
The SAE did not bear out as an adequate measure of its intended constructs, but our 
psychometric scrutiny of Irwin et al.’s (2013) approach revealed valuable, new insights that 
potentially transcend mere measurement issues. In particular, the item locations of specific 
PAE and PPA questions in their respective Rasch hierarchies revealed some interesting 
trends. In this context, we can distinguish between internal (S, subjective or internalized) and 
external (O, objective or externalized) categories of experience, following previous studies in 
anomalistic psychology (e.g., Houran, Wiseman, & Thalbourne, 2002; Hufford, 1982).  The 
types of events in the Rasch hierarchies (i.e., those with lower logit values) that were most 
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easily given credence (PAE) and attributed to the paranormal (PPA) seemed to involve 
personally-relevant incidents with at least some external (or objective) basis. Accordingly, we 
propose that our respondents are best characterized as predominantly striving to interpret 
private experience or information that was connected to (or corroborated by) information in 
their social or physical environments, i.e., amalgams of S and O features. This idea should be 
studied in more depth, since it adds a new dimension to the basic SAE approach and broader 
operationalizations encompassing religious, esoteric or even delusional ideations.  
Moreover, across the PAE, PPA and SAE3 we observed a powerful residual or 
secondary factor that varied with the items’ difficulty levels (i.e., extremity-bias). 
Establishing the prevalence and impact of this effect will be critically important, because, to 
our knowledge, it has not been previously reported in the literature, and its validation would 
have far-reaching implications. We note that earlier models have stressed the similarities and 
differences between anomalous experiences and unorthodox attributions (Lange & Houran, 
1998, 1999), as well as their relation within linear and non-linear process models (Lange & 
Houran, 2000, 2001). However, it will become necessary to re-assess and re-interpret the 
assumptions currently held about the causes, correlates and clinical import of anomalous 
experience and paranormal attributions if measurement in this entire domain has been 
systemically distorted or confounded by extremity-biases.  
As a first step we propose conceptual replications across independent samples and 
using different instruments pertinent to anomalous experience and paranormal belief (for 
listings of pertinent measures, see e.g., Goulding & Parker, 2001; Irwin, 2009, Appendix). 
These efforts should also include clinical measures of delusional beliefs, since the concepts 
related to the formation and labeling of anomalous experiences in the general population are 
germane to cognitive theories of delusions (cf. Houran & Lange, 2004; Irwin, Dagnall, & 
Drinkwater, 2012; Ross et al., 2017). Ultimately, we argue that the theoretical insights of the 
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present research, in conjunction with Rasch (1960/1980) scaling, will aid greatly in refining 
the conceptualization and measurement of anomalous experiences and paranormal 
attributions, and ultimately promote more robust theory-formation grounded in anomalistic 
psychology.  
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